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For a world constantly trying to make sense of its own struggles, 
comic book writers’ ability to divide reality into boxes and speech 
bubbles is as refreshing as it is entertaining.  In comics, villains are 
identifiable external sources of chaos which routinely are brought to 
justice by an array of heroes—some of whom are relatably conflicted, 
others idealistically noble.  A steady stream of reboots, film and 
television adaptations, and superhero-themed merchandise allow us to 
follow unending variations on our favorite theme.  Given that superhero 
characters work as hard for the success of their franchises as they do for 
their beloved cities, it is surprising how much intellectual property law 
struggles with the protection of characters.  Any new hero on the scene 
must not be too similar to those who have gone before, as claims for 
copyright infringement of famous characters are perhaps harder to defeat 
than the notorious Bane.1 
Our intuition tells us that a character like Superman feels 
protectable.2  But what about Spiderman’s Aunt May?  Intuition is less 
helpful.  Does the copyright in the comics in which she appears also 
protect her image when used in a different work?  Characters cannot be 
registered separately for copyright,3 but that does not exclude them from 
copyright protection. 4  Our Aunt May’s exact visual depiction, straight 
out of the comic book cell, is protected as part of the copyrighted comic.5  
However, if another depiction is less exact, the law struggles to 
1.  Bane is counted among Batman’s most challenging villains—he is generally known
as “The Man Who Broke the Bat” after snapping Batman’s back across his knee.  See DOUG 
MOENSCH (w), JIM APARO (p) & DICK GIORDANO (i), BATMAN VOL. 1 SER. NO. 497: THE 
BROKEN BAT (1940). 
2. See, e.g., Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding
Superman copyrighted).  
3. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
313.4(H) (3d ed. 2014). 
4.  COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408 (West 2017).  (“[R]egistration is not a
condition of copyright protection.”). 
5.  See discussion infra Part II.
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determine at what point that depiction shows an older woman, not Aunt 
May.  Without her name, would she even be recognizable?  And since 
names cannot be protected by copyright,6 why does the name seem 
important to the analysis?  Courts have attempted to articulate a test for 
when the copyright in an original work should also shield characters 
from copying7—essentially, trying to determine whether an Aunt May 
should be treated like a nameless background character, or like a 
Superman.  Unfortunately, the result is an unsatisfying scattershot of 
case law that creates unpredictable results for authors.8 
In a recent addition to this cluster of cases, DC Comics v. Towle,9 
the Ninth Circuit took an expansive view of character copyright that 
declared Batman’s gadget-equipped vehicle, the Batmobile, protectable 
as a character.10  This Comment analyzes the reasoning and policy 
repercussions of the Towle decision and its inadministrable “gut feeling” 
protection scheme.  Part I provides brief background information 
regarding modern copyright law.  Part II traces the history and expansion 
of character copyright, including problematic precedents created 
throughout the doctrine’s development.  Part III explores the culmination 
of these precedents in the Towle decision.  Part IV analyzes the legal 
repercussions involved in the Towle reasoning and current state of 
character copyright law.  Finally, Part V offers a proposal for a new 
character copyright test, or, better, a switch to trademark law that uses 
overtones already present in character cases to alleviate future 
uncertainty. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of Copyrightable Subject Matter
1. Requirements of Copyrightability
Copyright arises in any original work of authorship that is fixed in
a tangible medium.11  An author is a person “to whom anything owes its 
6.  Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles, or Short Phrases, United
States Copyright Office Circular 34, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf; see, e.g., 
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
7.  See discussion infra Part II.
8.  See discussion infra Parts II, III, IV.
9.  DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015).
10.  Id. at 1022–23.  The court employed a three-part test for character copyrightability,
relying heavily on a single precedent for the proposition that a car could be a character.  See 
discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
11.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2017).  Eight potential categories are enumerated, but the list is
non-exhaustive and the statute contemplates new methods of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2017).  The work is fixed when it is embodied with the author’s authority in either a copy or 
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origin; originator; maker.”12  The originality requirement entails at least 
some “intellectual invention.”13  Still, the degree of originality required 
is low—independent creation by an author with minimal creativity is 
sufficient.14  Even a selection or arrangement of individually non-
copyrightable elements may give rise to a copyright, albeit only in the 
creative arrangement.15  In contrast, when telephone books containing 
non-copyrightable factual information are arranged in the standard way 
(alphabetically by last name), there is no originality.16  The Supreme 
Court has rejected the historic “sweat of the brow” doctrine, which 
emphasized that copyright was the reward for an author’s time, effort, 
and expense.17  Copyright must have some limits: “not all copying . . . is 
copyright infringement.”18 
 As copyright arises automatically in all works of authorship that 
are fixed in a tangible medium, it is important that the doctrine maintains 
existing limitations to avoid impoverishing the public domain.  The 
doctrines to follow provide some of these limitations. 
2. Key Limitations on Copyrightable Subject Matter
a. Useful Articles
Two-dimensional and three-dimensional pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works are considered copyrightable subject matter; however, 
the copyright cannot be aimed at protecting the design of a useful 
article.19  A “useful article” has some “intrinsic utilitarian function that 
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
phonorecord, and it is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2017). 
12.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884).
13.  Id.
14.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 346 (1991).
15.  Id. at 348.
16.  Id. at 361–62.
17.  Id. at 359–60 (expressly discarding the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in favor of the
originality doctrine as the touchstone for copyright eligibility).  The quintessential “sweat of 
the brow” discussion is found in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 
215, 245 (1918).   
18.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
19.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2017) (“Such [pictorial, graphic, and sculptural] works shall include 
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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information.”20  Such articles include clothing or machinery.21  However, 
separable creative expressions applied to useful articles are protectable 
as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.22  To note a common 
example, a floral relief carved on a chair can be copyrighted, as it adds 
no functionality to the chair.23  However, the design of the chair cannot 
be copyrighted.24  Thus, although a bicycle rack was based on wire 
sculptures and arguably was more artful than other racks, the design 
could not be separated from its functionality, because each element of 
the design was chiefly influenced by utilitarian considerations.25 
b. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Factual material cannot be original, and therefore cannot be 
copyrightable by itself.26  Where copyrightable material is mixed with 
facts or ideas, the copyright can only extend to protect the original 
expression of the author.27  “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”28 
Similarly, when there are only a limited number of ways—or just 
one way—to express an idea, the expression is said to merge with the 
idea.29  For example, if copyrights were permitted in such works as the 
instructions for entering a sweepstakes, there might be no substantially 
non-infringing way to communicate the procedure required for the 
sweepstakes entry.30  A “thin” copyright might be allowed, meaning that 
20.  Id.
21.  Copyright Registration for Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works, United States
Copyright Office Circular 40, at *2, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf. 
22.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
23.  H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 55, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
24.  Id.
25.  Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987);
Ribbon Rack, http://www.ribbonrack.com/ (showing photographs of the bicycle rack in 
question).  See generally Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) 
(upholding the separability test and finding that the chevrons and other shapes on cheerleading 
uniforms were separable and therefore protectable designs, since they would be protectable if 
painted on a canvas rather than sewn on clothing). 
26.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1991).
27.  Id.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2017); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding
that blank accounting books are not copyrightable, nor is the method of accounting underlying 
the author’s work). 
29. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding
that sweepstakes rules could not be copyrighted because the “subject matter would be 
appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression”). 
30.  Id. at 679.
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there is only a thin layer of creative expression overlying facts or ideas, 
such that only virtually identical copying would constitute 
infringement.31   
An arguable outgrowth of the idea/expression dichotomy, the 
scènes à faire doctrine, teaches that “stock characters, settings, or events 
that are common to a particular subject matter” cannot be copyrighted 
“because they are commonplace and lack originality.”32  Any elements 
that may be considered “indispensable, or at least standard, in the 
treatment of” a given subject fit within this category.33 The inclusion of 
such scènes à faire—commonplace, rudimentary material—does not 
defeat copyright registration for the work as a whole, if it is otherwise 
sufficiently original.34  The doctrine merely aims to preserve stock 
thematic content for other authors who wish to treat a topic as it is 
normally treated, without granting to any one author a monopoly over a 
particular genre or storyline.  In addition, it helps constrain the breadth 
of liability for copyright infringement.35  If elements that are considered 
scènes à faire were covered by copyright, then it would be difficult to 
determine whether an author extracted her stock content from the public 
domain or from copying.  As a result, authors would be unable to write 
without seeking numerous advance permissions after attempting to 
determine the original author.36  For example, a police procedural story 
long would have been copyrighted out of existence if common, 
unoriginal elements such as foot chases, seedy underworld characters, or 
an urban slum setting were protectable.37 
II. CHARACTER COPYRIGHT
A. An Overview of the Doctrine
1. “Sufficiently Original”
The doctrine of character copyright is another area where courts
have imposed additional limitations on the monopoly granted by 
copyright.  When an author expresses a character, that character 
constitutes only a part of that author’s larger expression.  However, many 
31.  Id. (rejecting the “thin” approach but noting that other circuits follow it).
32.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
313.4(I). (3d ed. 2014). 
33.  Id.
34.  Id.
35.  Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
36.  Id.
37.  See id. (citing Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (using 
an example of police fiction to illustrate scènes à faire more concretely)). 
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storylines are equipped with a panoply of supporting and minor 
characters.  These may serve as plot devices, comic relief, or even just a 
backdrop for a more realistic microcosm.  The chorus in theater, the 
extras in film, and the background characters in books remind us that our 
life is populated with people that may drift through or even minutely 
affect our story. 
Characters cannot be separately registered for copyright protection, 
although they may receive protection as part of the broader work if they 
contain sufficient original authorship.38  Even when a character is 
“sufficiently original” to merit protection, that protection is limited to 
the artistic expression of the character.39  Public use of the name or 
general idea underlying the character—due to the guiding principles of 
the idea/expression dichotomy—does not by itself give rise to 
infringement.40  Therefore, courts must determine whether a character is 
sufficiently original. 
The Seventh Circuit has illustrated the slippery slope that arises in 
determining whether a character is stock or original: “If a drunken old 
bum were a copyrightable character, so would be a drunken suburban 
housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking 
cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, a 
masked magician . . .”41  In total, a character must avoid the pitfall of 
being a stock character to undergo the courts’ evaluation of sufficient 
originality.  Characters like drunken old bums and common story 
elements like foot chases are ineligible for copyright protection despite 
the addition of expressive elements.  In other words, courts decline to 
consider stock characters as having any expressive content. 
2. Applying the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
When a character does surpass the sufficiently original threshold,
“the original, visual aspects of a character may be protected . . . This may 
include the physical attributes of the character, such as facial features 
and specific body shape, as well as images of clothing and any other 
visual elements.”42  Conversely, a character’s concept, general 
personality, conduct, temperament, or costume cannot be covered by the 
copyright.43  Note the tension between protectable “images of clothing” 
as physical manifestations of the character’s appearance, and “costume” 
38. COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 313.4(H).
39.  COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 911.
40.  COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 313.4(H).
41.  Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660.
42.  COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 911.
43.  COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 911.
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as the general idea regarding the type or color scheme of clothing that 
the character wears.44  Again, the principle is the idea/expression 
dichotomy: an author may exclude others from using his particular 
original expression of a magician, for example, but he may not prevent 
other authors from creating magician characters.  Therefore, for 
sufficiently original characters, courts must tease out protectable artistic 
expressions and leave behind any underlying ideas. 
For example, a sufficiently original character—say, Sherlock 
Holmes45—has protectable artistic expression layered over the otherwise 
generic concept of a keenly observant detective.  Consider the attributes 
that make Sherlock Holmes different from another detective, Hercule 
Poirot.46  The distinctly British Holmes is known for his drug use, the 
hapless omnipresence of his associate Dr. John Watson, and a bohemian 
manner of housekeeping at odds with his methodical mind.47  In contrast, 
the Belgian Poirot is as meticulous outwardly as he is inwardly, with a 
special obsession with his carefully waxed mustache.48  Poirot is 
portrayed as small in stature,49 while Holmes cuts a more vital figure, 
often involved in combat.50  The idea/expression dichotomy calls for a 
character copyright to be carefully defined to ensure that future stories 
have a detective to solve their mysteries, but not necessarily a Holmes.51 
44.  However, a costume that is three-dimensional and wearable, such as a Halloween
costume, may be copyrightable to the extent that it survives the useful article analysis, i.e. it 
has artistic elements separable from the utilitarian concerns of clothing.  See, e.g., Chosun 
Intern., Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. 
Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017); Masquerade 
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990); cf. Whimsicality, Inc. 
v. Rubie’s Costume Co., Inc., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
45.  Sherlock Holmes was first introduced in 1887 in the short story “A Study in Scarlet,” 
published in Beeton’s Christmas Annual and written by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.  Holmes 
would continue to feature in Conan Doyle’s stories until his exit in the “The Final Problem,” 
published in Strand Magazine in 1893, though he would be resurrected and featured in other 
media over time.  Encyclopædia Britannica, “Sherlock Holmes,” 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sherlock-Holmes. 
46.  Hercule Poirot was a fastidious detective first introduced in1920 in the novel The
Mysterious Affair at Styles, by Agatha Christie.  He would feature in a number of her works, 
exiting in Curtain in 1975.  Encyclopædia Britannica, “Hercule Poirot,” 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hercule-Poirot. 
 47. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Sherlock Holmes,”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sherlock-Holmes. 
 48. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Hercule Poirot,”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hercule-Poirot. 
49. Id.
 50. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Sherlock Holmes,”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sherlock-Holmes; The Arthur Conan Doyle Encyclopedia, 
“Sherlock Holmes,” https://www.arthur-conan-
doyle.com/index.php?title=Sherlock_Holmes.  
51.  The original short stories introducing Sherlock Holmes have passed into the public
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B. The Evolution of Character Copyrightability
1. Judge Learned Hand’s Influence
As with many doctrines, character copyright looks back to Judge
Learned Hand’s jurisprudence for its origins.  His seminal discussion of 
the appropriateness of character copyright occurred in 1930.52  In 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation,53 the plaintiff was the author 
of a play, and the defendant was the author of an allegedly infringing 
motion picture.54  At their core, both works featured a forbidden love 
between the children of Irish and Jewish parents, respectively.55  The 
court acknowledged that at least some of the author’s first work belonged 
to the public domain, noting that “her copyright did not cover everything 
that might be drawn from her play . . . We have to decide how 
much . . .”56  The reason for such a determination was to ensure that any 
copyright in the play would cover only the author’s expression, not the 
ideas needed by other authors to treat a similar subject.57  The two plays 
in question had two sets of common characters: two lovers that were “so 
faintly indicated as to be no more than stage properties,” and two 
fathers.58 
The court expressed a general hesitation to grant monopoly in a 
character.59  Judge Learned Hand wrote that a copying author might: 
so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it 
would not be enough that . . . he cast a riotous knight who kept 
wassail to the discomfort of his household, or a vain and foppish 
steward who became amorous of his mistress.  These would be no 
more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the play . . . [T]he less developed 
the character, the less they can be copyrighted . . .60 
In other words, characters ought to be left in the public domain 
unless they are so well-defined and original as to become proprietary. 
By this measure, the secret lovers were neither original nor well-
developed; therefore, even if the defendant did copy his frustrated lovers 
domain, enabling modern writers to use his character as it was defined in the first stories, but 
leaving out any added characteristics of the later, still-copyrighted stories.  Klinger v. Conan 
Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014). 
52.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
53.  Id.
54.  Id. at 119.
55.  Id. at 119–20.
56.  Id. at 122.
57.  Id.
58.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
59.  Id. at 121.
60.  Id.
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from the plaintiff, those characters were not protected by copyright.61  
The lovers’ fathers may have been better described in the play, but they 
were “low comedy” stereotypes of Jewish and Irish men; as such stock 
characters, or scènes à faire, the fathers were ineligible for protection 
regardless of originality.62  This first consideration of character 
copyright engendered a limited doctrine that helped encourage authors 
to draw from a vast public body of inspiration, while refusing to grant 
further rewards to an author who did not add her own expression to either 
a generic character or a well-worn stereotype. 
2. A Tale of Two Tests
a. The “Sam Spade Test”
Following Judge Learned Hand’s analysis, character copyright 
remained elusive, particularly with respect to literary characters lacking 
a visual representation.  In a 1954 case, Warner Bros. Pictures v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System,63 author Dashiell Hammett argued that 
his detective character, Sam Spade,64 was not licensed for the creation of 
derivative works along with the rest of The Maltese Falcon.65  The 
licensee of The Maltese Falcon story for radio, television, and movie 
development had sued Hammett for infringement, after Hammett had 
published new stories featuring Sam Spade and licensed the Falcon 
characters—but not the Falcon story itself—for additional derivative 
works.66  The Ninth Circuit noted that where the character “constitutes 
the story being told,” he is a copyrightable element; where he “is only 
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of 
protection afforded by the copyright.”67  By being outside the scope of 
the story’s copyright, the character’s re-use in another work would be 
non-infringing.68  This rather unsatisfying test for copyright eligibility—
which was arguably outside the scope of an otherwise plain case of 
contract interpretation—became known as the “Sam Spade test.”69 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress did not intend the 
nonexclusive sale of a copyright to foreclose an author’s right to create 
61.  Id. at 121–22.
62.  Id. at 122.
63.  Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
64.  Sam Spade was first introduced in The Maltese Falcon by Dashiell Hammett in 1930. 
Id. at 945.  
65.  Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 949–50.
66.  Id. at 948.
67.  Id. at 950.
68.  Id.
69.  See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticizing the
Warner Bros. decision). 
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additional stories with his own characters, particularly where the 
characters are merely “chessm[e]n.”70  Although a character may be 
licensed separately from its original story, a license may not be necessary 
because some characters are not covered under the original story’s 
copyright once separated from that story.71  In other words, unoriginal or 
stock characters need not be licensed for use in derivative works, as they 
are only copyrighted to the extent of the author’s exact original 
expression in the author’s copyrighted work.  The next author in need of 
such a stock or unoriginal character may freely use it.  Therefore, there 
could be no infringement between The Maltese Falcon and any new Sam 
Spade adventures.72  While the old and new works followed Sam Spade 
in a noir-style short story involving a “complicated search for a lost 
article of fabulous value,” the new story was not so like the Falcon as to 
be practically the same and the characters were merely storytelling 
“vehicles.”73 
Without directly saying it, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be invoking 
the scènes à faire doctrine in its consideration of Sam Spade—
particularly in its brief discussion of the similar styles, settings, character 
cast, and subject matter.74  If not, then the court arguably prevents 
character copying from ever being a basis for infringement, despite 
originality.75  After all, if use of the same lead character in two stories 
does not speak to substantial similarity, it is difficult to imagine a 
character original enough or similar enough to somehow pass the 
threshold.  Later, in Gaiman v. McFarlane,76 Judge Richard Posner 
criticized the Sam Spade result for that reason and considered its holding 
to be contingent on two facts: (1) that Hammett wished only to use his 
own character in future works, while his own licensee was attempting to 
exclude him from such use, and (2) that despite a detailed description of 
Sam Spade’s physical appearance, “[t]he description of a character in 
prose leaves much to the imagination,” unlike a visual character.77  A 
70.  Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950.
71.  Id.
72.  Id. at 951.
73.  Id.
74.  See id. at 951.
75.  Indeed, despite articulating the “Sam Spade test,” Warner Bros. is cited for the
proposition that, ordinarily, characters are not copyrightable.  Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 
F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988).
76.  Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
77.  Id. at 660. The Seventh Circuit briefly noted that it considered Sam Spade to be a
“famously distinctive” character, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  Id.  
Distinctiveness, however, is the province of trademark law.  Courts’ confusion of 
distinctiveness with the tests for character copyrightability is another reason for a new, clearer 
standard in this area of law. 
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reader must “complete[ ] the work in his mind,” while moviegoers and 
comic-book readers passively receive prepared images.78  These 
received images create a stronger impression of a character on the mind 
of the audience, such that the character would be recognizable in other 
settings.79 
b. The Delineation Test
Later, beginning in 1978, the Ninth Circuit would move away from 
the Sam Spade decision without expressly overruling it, seemingly 
relaxing the standard for character copyrightability.  In Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pirates,80 the Ninth Circuit cabined its Warner Bros. 
decision by stating that “it is difficult to delineate distinctively a literary 
character . . . [W]hile many literary characters may embody little more 
than an unprotected idea, a comic book character, which has physical as 
well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique 
elements of expression.”81  The court therefore seemed to confine the 
use of the “Sam Spade test” to literary characters, while approving 
another test for visual characters that hinged on an author’s ability to 
“delineate distinctively,” likely using visual expressions.82  The 
benchmark for sufficient delineation hearkens back to Judge Learned 
Hand’s discussion in Nichols and the scènes à faire doctrine: is the 
character so well-defined that it is more than a trope? 
In Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit applied its delineation test to 
Mickey Mouse83 to determine if Disney could assert its copyright against 
parodic comic books featuring the famous mouse.84  The case was 
decided under a previous version of the Copyright Act, which allowed 
for copyright in all copyrightable component parts of a work—including, 
under a line of older case law, characters.85  As discussed, the court 
refused to follow the “Sam Spade test” and found that the cartoon 
Mickey was sufficiently delineated to be copyrightable, apparently 
78.  Id. at 661.
79.  Id.  Arguably, the court is continuing to borrow from trademark law in considering
the impression of a character on the mind of an audience member.  Ordinarily, this would 
speak to the distinctiveness of a mark and the scope of protection afforded it. 
80.  Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
81.  Id. at 755.  This language predates Judge Posner’s criticism of the “Sam Spade test”
in Gaiman, although both Air Pirates and Gaiman were preoccupied with the difference 
between visual and literary characters.  See supra text accompanying notes 76–79.  
82. Id.
83.  Mickey Mouse’s most notable early appearance was in the cartoon short “Steamboat
Willie,” in 1928, following his creation by Walt Disney and Ub Iwerks.  Encyclopædia 
Britannica, “Mickey Mouse,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mickey-Mouse.  
84.  Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753.
85.  Id. at 754.
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relying on its fame and well-known visual aspect.86  Had the court 
applied the “Sam Spade test,” it is unlikely Mickey would have obtained 
the same deferential treatment—arguably, the Mouse is the vehicle for 
storytelling in the same way that Sam Spade was.  While a central 
character in many cartoons, Mickey Mouse is little more than a cartoon 
animal with a quick wit.  Of course his visual expression is protectable, 
despite relatively minor changes over time, but it is unclear whether 
Mickey Mouse merits protection because he is an original character from 
copyrighted works, or because he has become so distinctive that he is a 
trademark for Disney.  The question of whether courts are simply 
rewarding authors for the creation of successful, episodic characters 
overshadows the character copyrightability doctrine—including the later 
Towle decision. 
C. Data Points in an Unpredictable Doctrine
Like other bodies of common law, the character copyright question
is litigated largely through analogy to a tangled web of decisions. 
Although the modern delineation test purports to weed out those 
characters that are insufficiently described to be within a work’s 
copyright, most decisions simply can be reframed so that the character 
seems to be scènes à faire.  The resulting doctrine operates as an exercise 
in arguing about whether there is truly anything new under the sun.87  A 
number of problematic decisions have issued using the delineation test—
sometimes in conjunction with the Sam Spade test—culminating in 
Towle in 2015. 
In Olson v. National Broadcasting Company,88 the television 
characters at issue were only depicted by “three- or four-line summaries 
in the . . . screenplay, plus whatever insight into their characters may be 
derived from their dialogue and action.”89  Although the characters were 
not necessarily stock under the scènes à faire doctrine, what they said 
and did was not enough for the copyright in the script to cover the 
characters.90  Since the copyright in a television show comprises the 
screenplay as a literary work,91 this result seems logical: with the 
86.  See id. at 755.
87. Ecclesiastes 1:9–10 (“So there is nothing new under the sun./ Is there anything of
which one might say, ‘See this, it is new’?”). 
88.  Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
89.  Id. at 1452.
90. Id. at 1452–53.
91.  A copyright only arises in a work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium.  17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2017).  The rights to perform and display a copyrighted work are then granted 
to the author as part of his bundle of rights.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4)–(5) (2017).  Therefore, 
the copyright in television shows and motion pictures cover the underlying scripts, as literary 
494 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
copyright in the screenplay, and the screenplay containing only limited 
descriptions of the characters, it follows that the copyright with respect 
to the characters should not extend very far.  Similar characters created 
for a different screenplay should not infringe, as insufficiently delineated 
characters have few particular traits and therefore are too easily called 
similar.  Only the exact description of the character, as stated in the 
copyrighted screenplay, can be protected from copying.  Such a scheme 
of protection generally rewards the author that spills a great deal of ink 
on original character development and refuses to punish alleged copying 
when characters are only vaguely outlined.   
District courts within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction have protected 
characters that include the tenacious boxer, Rocky Balboa;92 the suave 
spy, James Bond;93 and the havoc-wreaking Godzilla.94  The first two 
cases wrestled with an articulation of the character copyright test and 
settled the matter by applying both the “Sam Spade test” and the 
delineation test, where either was sufficient to show copyrightability.95  
Despite these precedents and proceeding in the same district court, the 
analysis of Godzilla focused exclusively on the delineation test, without 
stating why.96 
In Anderson v. Stallone, following three successful Rocky films 
written by and starring Sylvestor Stallone, a screenwriter wrote and 
submitted to the same production company his own treatment for a 
fourth Rocky film; naturally, he used the same cast of characters.97  
Stallone and the production company heard the screenwriter’s pitch, 
entered some preliminary contract discussions, but chose not to purchase 
the treatment.98  However, the writer alleged that his work was used as 
the basis for Stallone’s subsequent Rocky IV script, and he sued for 
copyright infringement, among other claims.99  The court held that the 
writer was not entitled to copyright protection for his movie treatment 
because the treatment itself was an unauthorized derivative work of 
Stallone’s copyrights in the original Rocky trilogy.100 
Crucial to the analysis was the wholesale importation of Stallone’s 
works, and airing the television show is an exercise of the rights to the audiovisual work. 
92.  Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989).   
93.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296–97
(C.D. Cal. 1995).   
94.  Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
95.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296; Anderson, 1989 WL 206431 at *7.
96.  Toho, 33 F. Supp. at 1215; cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296.
97.  Anderson, 1989 WL 206431 at *1.
98.  Id.
99.  Id. at *1–2.
100.  Id. at *11.
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original cast of characters.101  The court declined to consider both 
whether any single character was covered under Stallone’s copyright and 
whether any character was so well-delineated that it could be protected 
from outright copying.102  It held that the characters and their 
relationships were so integral to Rocky’s story that they satisfied the 
“Sam Spade test,” because those relationships constituted the story being 
told.103  Further, the first three movies so highly developed the 
characters, their mannerisms, and their physical appearances that the 
characters were protected under Stallone’s copyrights as a matter of 
law.104   
Therefore, the Anderson result was a relatively clear-cut application 
of character copyright doctrine.  Although the court couched its decision 
in the importance and delineation of the Rocky characters’ relationships, 
the critical fact seemed to be that a second author had replicated another 
author’s cast of characters and transplanted them into his own work, 
intending them to be identifiable in name, manner, and appearance as the 
same as the original author’s.  However, the cases following Anderson 
had a much more difficult time addressing characters that were not 
identical or that have changed over time. 
For example, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda 
Motor Company, the court addressed whether James Bond’s evolution 
over a series of works defeated his coverage under copyright.105  The 
court re-formulated the delineation test, calling for “consistent, widely 
identifiable traits.”106  Sufficient delineation is achieved with such traits, 
relative to the consuming audience.  If that audience can see the 
character, fewer traits may be needed; if the audience reads about the 
character, much more may be required.  The identifiability requirement 
may explain why results seem to correlate with the author’s market 
saturation.  Despite the fact that multiple actors have played James Bond, 
the court found that James Bond had enough consistent traits to remain 
the same character regardless of the change in actor, year, setting, and 
story.107  These traits were identified as “his cold-bloodedness; his overt 
sexuality; his love of martinis ‘shaken, not stirred’; his marksmanship; 
his ‘license to kill’ and use of guns; his physical strength; his 
101.  Id. at *8.
102.  Id.
103.  Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989). 
104.  Id. at *7.
105. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296
(C.D. Cal. 1995).   
106.  Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
107.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296.
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sophistication.”108 
While the reasoning seems sound—a character that is identifiable 
despite new surroundings is copyrightable—the actual traits that the 
court relied upon seem weak.  The concept of a witty, alpha-male, world-
class spy hardly seems distinct from the witty, alpha-male, world-class 
detective that we met in Sam Spade.  If it is a visual depiction that makes 
James Bond better delineated than Sam Spade, why the court’s focus on 
non-visual traits to demonstrate consistency?  Further, if non-visual traits 
can be the key delineators, then the favoritism toward visually depicted 
characters over literary characters seems unfounded—particularly when 
their appearances change, as with James Bond’s series of actors.  Finally, 
speaking to the court’s selected traits, a spy that was not at least 
somewhat cold-blooded, a good marksman, and in possession of a 
passing familiarity with guns would be useless.  Presumably the spy need 
not necessarily be a sexual, strong, sophisticated ladies’ man as with 
James Bond, but the fact that a spy would be such a fellow is certainly 
not beyond the pale.  Even his affinity for martinis seems only to play 
into his hyper-masculine stock image: the man knows what he wants, 
including in a stiff drink.  (Although, arguably, using the martini scene 
is a uniquely delineated way of portraying that masculinity.)  Regardless, 
it seems questionable that a character is better delineated with the 
addition of a predictable stock set of traits, like when a typical spy is 
given the typical characteristics of a ladies’ man.  Even if “license to 
kill” as a phrase could perhaps be copyrighted,109 the concept of a spy 
permitted to kill is uncopyrightable as an idea.  All in all, the court’s 
analysis seems to not only ignore the well-established scènes à faire 
doctrine, but also impermissibly considers uncopyrightable ideas as 
evidence of expressive character delineation. 
Similarly, in Toho Company v. William Morrow & Company, the 
court relied on the consistent traits factor to differentiate Godzilla from 
other characters in fiction, thereby considering him better delineated 
than a stock monster character despite his changed traits over a series of 
works.110  Although over the course of the films in question, Godzilla 
transformed from an evil character into a good one, the court identified 
that Godzilla was consistently a “pre-historic, fire-breathing, gigantic 
108.  Id.
109.  Subject to restrictions on the copyright of short phrases, “license to kill” could be
considered a copyrightable element of the larger, clearly copyrightable works involving James 
Bond.  Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles, and or Short Phrases, supra 
note 6. 
110.  Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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dinosaur alive and well in the modern world.”111  These traits were called 
“highly delineated” and “contain[ed] the requisite attribute of 
originality.”112  Therefore, Godzilla was found copyrightable under the 
delineation test alone.113 
The Toho case seems as troubling as the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
result, if not more so.  First, as in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the traits 
highlighted as consistent in Toho do not seem to make Godzilla any 
better delineated than a dragon, dinosaur, or other stock beast that 
threatens some corner of the world.  That he breathes fire makes him 
distinct from a stock dinosaur, but also moves him somewhat closer to a 
stock dragon. 
Second, a technical question arises: is Godzilla a character in the 
traditional sense, or a plot device?  His actions and appearance drive the 
story, but the real story also seems to be more about how people deal 
with his arrival than about the dinosaur itself.  Jurassic Park114 and its 
offshoot Jurassic World115 both feature pre-historic dinosaurs in the 
modern world.  Jurassic Park unleashes a variety of dinosaurs on 
unwitting scientists, while Jurassic World arguably follows a single 
dinosaur, the bioengineered Indominus rex, and the humans that fight 
against it.116  It seems unlikely that the dinosaurs from either movie—
regardless of centrality to the plot—would be considered characters.  The 
dictionary definition of character does not contemplate non-human 
characters.117  While characters clearly can encompass non-humans—
think Disney’s Mickey Mouse118—the non-human characters that we 
love have been made deeply anthropomorphic.  In Toho, while it is 
doubtful that Godzilla is particularly anthropomorphic in any of its 
appearances, the court neither relies upon nor discusses 
anthropomorphism as a factor for delineation in a non-human would-be 
character.119  This omission becomes problematic when the Ninth Circuit 
111.  Id.
112.  Id. (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
113.  Toho, 33 F. Supp. at 1215.
114.  Jurassic Park was originally a novel.  It was later a movie by the same name.  The
plot involves a dinosaur zoo whose security capabilities become overwhelmed, thus letting 
loose the dinosaurs to wreak havoc.  MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK (1990); JURASSIC 
PARK (Universal Pictures 1993). 
115.  Jurassic World, an offshoot of the Jurassic Park series, closely follows a single,
particularly formidable dinosaur—much like Godzilla.  JURASSIC WORLD (Universal Pictures 
2015). 
116. Id.; cf. JURASSIC PARK (film), supra note 114.
117.  “[O]ne of the persons of a drama or novel; the personality or part which an actor
recreates.”  Merriam Webster, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/character. 
118.  To name one backed by case law: Mickey Mouse; see supra text accompanying and
following notes 80–86. 
119. See generally Toho, 33 F. Supp.
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turns to Towle. 
In Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Company,120 a masked magician that 
performs and then teaches his magic tricks in a video was not 
copyrightable.121  The Ninth Circuit adopted the delineation test as 
formulated in the foregoing district court cases, focusing on “consistent, 
widely identifiable traits.”122  In Rice, a magician had only appeared in 
one modest home video, while dressed in traditional magician suit-and-
cape garb and performing magic tricks.123  The character was not 
distinguishable from other magicians.124  Another factor, then, may be 
the extent to which a character’s speech and conduct differentiate him 
from a stock character—a requirement that hearkens back to Olson. 
In Rice, the court still alternatively evaluated the “story being told” 
“Sam Spade test” for copyrightability.125  The magician, as the tool for 
communicating how to perform tricks, was just like the mere 
“chessman” under that analysis.126  His dialogue was limited to some 
commentary and a narrative of how the tricks shown were performed.127  
Also, what the plaintiff considered the story—a rogue magician willing 
to disguise himself, risk the ire of his colleagues, and disclose the trade’s 
secrets—was more a demonstration of how to recreate popular magic.128  
Therefore, the character was not copyrightable under either of the two 
tests coexisting in the Ninth Circuit.129  Following the Rice court’s 
application of both tests, it remains unclear whether the “Sam Spade 
test” is only appropriate for literary characters, if it is viewed as a second 
step in the copyrightability analysis, or if it is something else altogether. 
In the Seventh Circuit’s Gaiman decision, an “unexpectedly 
knowledgeable old wino” named Nicholas Cogliostro130 was depicted in 
the comic-book series Spawn and later deemed copyrightable.131  Not 
only does the case provide a recent counterpoint to the older and more 
conservative Olson opinion, it demonstrates how important the court-
120.  Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1175, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003).




125.  Id. at 1176.
126.  Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003).
127.  Id.
128.  Id.
129.  Id. at 1175 (citing the “especially distinctive” and “story being told” tests side by
side, where success under either test alone would give rise to a copyright in the character). 
130.  Cogliostro first appeared in Spawn #9 as a hobo, later revealed to be another
Hellspawn, who has an anti-destructive influence on Spawn.  NEIL GAIMAN (w) & TODD 
MCFARLANE (a), SPAWN VOL. 1 SER. NO. 9: ANGELA! (1993). 
131.  Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2004).
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constructed character concept, including names, has become.  In 
Gaiman, the court found the character’s “age, obviously phony title 
(‘Count’), what he knows and says, his name, and his faintly Mosaic 
facial features combine to create a distinctive character.”132  Without 
these additional traits, the court noted that Cogliostro would have 
undoubtedly been a stock character:133 the drunken bum.134  As a visual 
character, Cogliostro is more susceptible to sufficient delineation by the 
author.  There is no question that the character was copyrightable; 
however, the court framed its holding in a suspiciously Olson-like three-
line summary of traits that included facial features akin to a historical 
figure’s, name and title, dialogue, actions, and age.135 
Overall, these cases demonstrate that the character copyright 
doctrine functions well when courts protect the precise expression of a 
visually depicted character that is being copied into an unauthorized 
work by another author—as in Anderson.  However, the Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer and Toho courts amalgamated an overarching character 
concept, built out of the court’s chosen traits, before comparing the 
original work to the allegedly infringing work to evaluate substantial 
similarity.  The problem is that in the court’s identification of certain 
traits that shape a character, the original character is reduced nearly to 
an idea, losing the nuances that might differentiate it from the allegedly 
infringing work.  Authors that appear to invoke this character concept 
are found to infringe; the more famous the original character, the easier 
it is for new authors to have raised its specter through a mere handful of 
commonalities.  The result is an expansion of the scope of the copyright 
protection. 
Names cannot be copyrighted,136 so name is an odd fact for the 
courts to rely upon except to the extent that a named character may be 
better delineated than an unnamed character.  While that seems 
obviously true, it is unhelpful as a differentiator.  Many characters, well-
delineated and stock, may be named, and few unnamed characters seem 
likely to be the subject of a copyright dispute.  It seems naive to think 
132.  Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660.
133.  Id.  Query how delineating traits need to be to constitute an overall well-delineated
character; compare Godzilla’s traits, see supra text accompanying notes 111–112, to 
Cogliostro’s traits here, or to the “three- or four-line summaries” of characters at issue in 
Olson, see supra text accompanying notes 89–90.   
134.  See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
135.  See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61.  Admittedly, the amount of ink spilled in giving
life to Cogliostro is at issue, not the amount of ink spilled in the court’s opinion.  Even so, the 
Gaiman court left much to be desired when it stated the short and relatively nondescript list 
of facts on which it based its holding. 
136.  Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles, and or Short Phrases, supra
note 6. 
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that, for example, if Jurassic World had called its central beast 
“Godzilla,” there would have been no copyright-related backlash. 
Indeed, under the Toho court’s description of Godzilla, Indominus rex 
could be infringing but for its lack of fire-breathing ability; under 
Gaiman, use of the Godzilla name would surely tip the balance toward 
infringement even if the fire-breathing trait was absent.  The question 
becomes whether characters—or famously recognizable plot elements, 
like Godzilla—are in fact being protected as trademarks that invoke the 
franchises that birthed them. 
Due to these decisions, character copyright remained a tangled 
doctrine as the Ninth Circuit neared 2015 and the Towle decision.  Little 
clarity was available on what test to use and what factors to weigh in the 
analysis.   
III. BATMAN AND FRIENDS . . . AND THEIR CARS?
A. Superheroes and the Delineation Test
The Second Circuit has focused on the delineation test to rule on
the copyrightability of Batman himself and other superheroes.137  The 
earliest of these cases, Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, 
concerned Superman138 and an infringing “Wonderman,” who wore a 
differently colored costume but otherwise was shown performing the 
same feats: crushing a gun, stopping a bullet, leaping a building, and 
championing the oppressed.139  The court rejected the argument that 
Superman was an archetypal character based on a representation of 
Hercules and other mythological sources.140  The combined pictorial and 
verbal representations of Superman evidenced “an arrangement of 
incidents and literary expressions original with the author” that gave rise 
to a copyright in the character.141  Notably, however, the court recalled 
137.  See Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992 (WHP), 2002 WL 485730 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2002) (holding Batman protected by copyright); DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, 
Inc., 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.1982) (assuming copyright for Batman and the Green Arrow); 
Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding Superman 
copyrighted); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fox Publ’ns, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y.1942) 
(directing a verdict for Detective Comics under the same reasoning as Bruns Publ’ns, and 
indeed against that same defendant, without discussion for infringing Batman and Robin with 
a parallel comic featuring The Lynx and Blackie the Mystery Boy). 
138.  Superman first appeared in Action Comics #1 in his classic backstory, as a
superpowered child, Clark Kent, who grow up to use his gifts for the world’s good.  JERRY 
SIEGEL (w) & JOE SHUSTER (a), ACTION COMICS VOL. 1  SER. NO. 1: SUPERMAN: CHAMPION 
OF THE OPPRESSED (1938). 
139.  Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d at 433.
140.  Id. at 433–34.
141.  Id.
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Nichols and limited part of the previously granted injunction to prohibit 
only close imitations, while expressly avoiding the grant of a monopoly 
over the idea of a super human who acts for the good of mankind.142 
In a similar evaluation for Batman143 at the district court level, the 
court echoed themes from the treatment of Godzilla and James Bond: 
consistent features creating an immediately recognizable identity could 
preserve copyrightability even when a character is repeatedly adapted.144  
In fact, it was essential that iterations of the “new” Batman must still be 
fundamentally the “old” Batman.145  Finding the evolution of the 
character not to be a bar to copyright,146 the court went on to consider 
the characteristics that make Batman unique.147  “Bat iconography” was 
discarded as the dispositive feature; other crime-fighting heroes and 
detectives had used bat-like costume features, bat icons, and bat signal 
projections.148  The key protectable elements were Batman’s horned 
cowl, cape, and the bat symbols on his chest, utility belt, and gloves, as 
well as a backstory that eschewed super powers in favor of a tragic 
commitment to stopping crime.149  Finally, the court noted episodic 
development of Batman’s character via interaction with others, 
including Robin and various villains—particularly where Batman 
refuses to kill, unlike those against him.150 
Superheroes seem more likely to pass the delineation test than many 
other characters: their abilities, whether innate or technology-driven, are 
often distinguishable from other superheroes; they are often visually 
depicted in comic books; they have well-developed characteristics and 
histories that are integral to how they oppose villains; their appearances 
are often highly stylized, with elaborate costuming or disguises that 
maintain some consistency in colors and symbols.  Each superhero is 
designed carefully to stand apart from stock hero ideas, lest it fail 
142.  Id. at 434.
143. Batman, already in black winged cape and gray suit, first appeared in Detective
Comics #27 to fight crime.  BILL FINGER (w) & BOB KANE (a), DETECTIVE COMICS VOL. 1 
SER. NO. 27: THE BAT-MAN: THE CASE OF THE CHEMICAL SYNDICATE (1939).  
144.  Sapon, 2002 WL 485730 at *2.
145.  Id.
146.  Id.
147.  Id. at *3.
148.  Id. “In the film The Bat Whispers (1930) the main character wore a black robe with
a realistic bat-shaped head, and used a batsignal reflected on a wall.  In the 1930’s, Black Bat 
Detective Mysteries featured a nondescript detective called ‘The Black Bat.’  (Les Daniels, 
Batman, The Complete History: The Life and Times of the Dark Knight 25-26 (1999) (‘The 
Complete History of Batman’)).  A character called the ‘Bat’ debuted in Popular Detective 
magazine in 1934.” Id. (internal citations in original). 
149.  Id. at *3-4.
150.  Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992 (WHP), 2002 WL 485730, *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2002). 
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commercially.  To that end, each one has a niche: Aquaman has oceanic 
powers; Captain America adds a retro feel to the classic super-soldier 
story; Spiderman shoots webs.  Thus, the results of these cases seem 
predictable and fair, particularly when juxtaposed with the struggles that 
courts have endured while deciding copyrightability for characters that 
stand out less. 
B. But . . . A Car?
In a rather strange twist on character doctrine in Halicki Films, LLC
v. Sanderson Sales and Marketing, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a car in a film could constitute an independently copyrightable
character.151  The movie in question was Gone in 60 Seconds, in which
a gangster specified forty-eight cars ranging from limos to exotics to be
stolen and delivered within five days.152  Each car was given a codename
by the would-be thieves, and “Eleanor” was the codename for a 1973
yellow Ford Mustang.153  The Ninth Circuit did not investigate these
finer plot points, intending to leave them to the district court:
The Eleanor character can be seen as more akin to a comic book 
character than a literary character. Moreover, Eleanor “display[s] 
consistent, widely identifiable traits,” and is “especially distinctive.” 
In both films, the thefts of the other cars go largely as planned, but 
whenever the main human character tries to steal Eleanor, 
circumstances invariably become complicated. In the Original GSS, 
the main character says “I’m getting tired of stealing this Eleanor 
car.” And in the Remake GSS, the main character refers to his history 
with Eleanor. Nevertheless, this fact-intensive issue must be 
remanded to the District Court for a finding in the first instance as to 
whether Eleanor is entitled to copyright protection. On remand the 
court should examine whether Eleanor’s “physical as well as 
conceptual qualities [and] . . . unique elements of expression” qualify 
Eleanor for copyright protection.154 
The case was not pursued on remand, so the required “fact-intensive 
inquiry” was never completed.155 
The court’s Halicki decision is problematic as a character copyright 
precedent for three reasons.  First, three different vehicles are identified 
during the film that the car thieves refer to by the Eleanor codename—
which was, again, used to indicate a type of vehicle, not a particular 
151.  Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales and Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2008).
152. GONE IN 60 SECONDS (H.B. Halicki Junkyard and Mercantile Company 1974).
153.  Id.
154.  Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1225 (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).
155. Id.
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vehicle.  Second, the physical attributes of the car—a yellow 1973 
Mustang—are not copyrightable under the useful articles doctrine 
because there are no artistic features that can be separated from the 
functionality of the car.156  Third, no characteristics set the Eleanor cars 
apart as characters.  There are virtually no physical attributes that make 
the Eleanor cars different or better delineated than any other Ford 
Mustang.  There are only two conceptual attributes unique to the Eleanor 
cars: their codename and difficulty of theft.  The fact that the car is hard 
to steal is better characterized as a plot device, without which the movie 
would be over quite quickly, rather than a character trait.  For these 
reasons, the Ninth Circuit in Halicki missed its chance to clarify the 
boundaries of character copyright doctrine. 
Then, in the 2015 Towle decision, the Ninth Circuit failed to make 
the course correction needed after Halicki.   In Towle, comic book 
publisher DC Comics, Inc. sued Mark Towle, owner of Gotham 
Garage.157  Mr. Towle marketed and sold what he advertised as 
Batmobile158 replicas for car collectors, with options for a ready-made 
or kit-version of the 1966 television Batmobile or 1989 movie 
Batmobile.159  Mr. Towle conceded that he was not licensed to sell any 
DC Comics trademarked or copyrighted materials; in contrast, DC 
Comics had licensed various producers for the television and movie 
adaptations, with express permission for the producers to author 
expressions of the Batmobile.160  Therefore, DC Comics did not own the 
copyrights in the Batmobile expressions on which it based the lawsuit.161  
For unknown reasons, DC Comics alone filed suit, so that the 
infringement had to be brought under the character copyright doctrine; 
unless DC Comics could prove that the Batmobile on the screen was the 
same as the Batmobile in the comic books, deserving of protection even 
outside the context of the original authored expressions in the comics, it 
could not sue.  Mr. Towle denied copyright infringement on the basis 
that the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 television show and the 
1989 movie was not one and the same character as in DC Comics’ 
expressions.162 
At the district court level, the Batmobile was found copyrightable 
due to the following attributes: “one consistent name that identifies [the 
156.  See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
157. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015).
158.  The Batmobile first appeared in 1941.  Id. at 1015.
159.  Id.
160.  Id. at 1016–17.
161. Id.  DC Comics contended that it maintained its merchandising rights, which the
court generally accepted as including copyright ownership.  This author disagrees. 
162.  Id. at 1017.
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Batmobile] as Batman’s personal vehicle,” consistent use of “high-tech 
gadgets and weaponry,” “bat-like motif,” black color, the qualities of 
being “swift, cunning, strong and elusive,” and depiction as a 
“superhero” in its own right—“Batman’s sidekick if not an extension of 
Batman’s own persona.”163  However, the district court also discussed 
the Batmobile’s potential protectability as a copyrightable sculptural 
work—an idea the Ninth Circuit declined to reach following its character 
decision.164 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reformulated the character 
copyrightability test into a three-prong approach to evaluate whether the 
character: (1) has physical as well as conceptual properties; (2) is 
sufficiently delineated as to be recognizable whenever it appears through 
consistent, identifiable traits; and (3) is especially distinctive, containing 
some elements of original expression.165  The court theorized that “even 
when a character lacks sentient attributes and does not speak (like a 
car),” the character can be protected if the copyrightability test is met.166 
The Towle court found that the Batmobile had consistent 
characteristics through its depiction in film and a television series.167  A 
consistent physical appearance was not important, as long as there was 
evidence of consistent attributes.168  “The changes in appearance . . . 
resemble costume changes that do not alter the Batmobile’s innate 
characteristics, any more than James Bond’s change from blue 
swimming trunks (in Casino Royale) to his classic tuxedo affects his 
iconic character.”169  Several physical attributes were cited, including 
bat-like features, like exaggerated fenders, a curved windshield, a bat 
emblem, and sometimes bat wings; more power than an ordinary car; 
and crime-fighting gadgets that change in number and function but are 
always some new item at the height of technology.170  Of course, the 
Batmobile of the 1966 television show and the Batmobile of the 1989 
movie are drastically different; the former, including the dramatic 
fenders and curved windshield cited by the Ninth Circuit, is based on a 
1955 Lincoln Futura concept car,171 while the latter featured bits and 
163. DC Comics v. Towle , 802 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2015) (approving the district 
court’s findings). 
164.  Id. at 1018, n.4.
165.  Id. at 1021.  The test combines elements of previous decisions into the tests, though
it notably excludes the “Sam Spade test.” 
166.  Id. at 1021–22.
167.  Id. at 1022.
168. Id.
169.  DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2015).
170.  Id. at 1021–22.
171. “Building the Batmobile Part 1,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAjt-
Vhmgwg; see also  http://1966batmobile.com/history/futura/. 
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pieces of Chevrolet Impala, Honda, and Ferrari cars, plus a custom 
body.172  Nonetheless, applying its new test, the Ninth Circuit found the 
Batmobile copyrightable.173 
Not only was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Towle decided for the 
wrong reasons under the standards of character copyright, but it failed to 
correct or clarify the faulty precedent in Halicki.  Despite the fact that in 
Halicki, the Ninth Circuit suggested but ultimately punted on Eleanor’s 
copyrightability, the Towle court held Halicki out as a blessing of car 
characters.174  Under the Towle reasoning, the Batmobile was not only a 
character in its own right, but an especially distinctive175 and therefore 
protected character,176 despite the separate copyrights in the 1966 
Batman television series and 1989 Batman movie.177  The Towle court 
simply incorporated all these Batmobile versions into one Batmobile 
copyright arising out of the comic books.   
Taken together, these decisions amount to an expansion of 
character copyright to include inanimate objects at worst, or mere stock 
characters at best.  With no governing legislation or Copyright Office 
regulations to guide the doctrine, it is challenging to imagine what 
pictorial “characters” might not be copyrightable. 
IV. ANALYSIS
The current state of character copyright is untenable, particularly in 
the Ninth Circuit.  Growth and change are to be expected in any doctrine, 
but the outer boundaries of character copyright remain unmarked,178 and 
a definitive test for protection is still not clearly articulated.179  There are 
four key issues with the Towle decision.  First, the Towle court should 
not have entertained DC Comics’ use of the character copyright doctrine 
at all.  Second, even if character copyright was an appropriate vehicle 
for the infringement claims, the Towle court should not have relied so 
heavily on Halicki for the proposition that a car can be a character 
without providing guidance to screen non-character cars.  Third, the 
172.  “Building the Batmobile Part 2,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoWv999XU-
0. 
173.  Towle, 802 F.3d at 1022.
174.  Id. at 1019–20.
175.  Furthering the confusion between the trademark standard for distinctiveness and the
copyright standard for delineation, the court reiterates the “especially distinctive” language of 
Halicki.  Id. at 1019 (citing  Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales and Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 
1225 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
176. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021–22.
177.  Id. at 1016.
178.  Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on A Legal
Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 786 (2013). 
179.  Id.
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Ninth Circuit’s test was ill-formulated and missed its chance to clarify 
character copyright law.  Finally, even though the Ninth Circuit likely 
reached the right result, its reasoning for protecting the Batmobile was 
improperly based on the inconsistent or uncopyrightable traits of the 
Batmobile. 
A. Forcing the Suit
First, momentarily setting aside criticisms of the law, the question
of character copyright should not have been before the court.  While Mr. 
Towle’s creations were infringing unauthorized copies—he copied the 
exact expression of the authors of the 1966 and 1989 Batmobiles180—he 
was sued by the wrong plaintiff.181  DC Comics did not own the 
copyright in the television series and movie which produced the 
Batmobile expressions that Mr. Towle then copied.182  To have standing 
to sue, DC Comics had to prove that the Batmobile as expressed in those 
two derivative works was the same Batmobile that appeared in the 
comics for which DC did hold copyrights—otherwise, the copyright 
owners of those specific Batmobile models were the producers licensed 
to create them.183  Using the character copyright doctrine was a creative 
and ultimately successful way to recover for an injury that DC Comics 
itself did not suffer.  The court permitted a forced character copyright 
analysis to transfer author’s rights to DC Comics that DC had previously 
licensed away.  
B. Misplaced Reliance on Halicki
Second, even if the character copyright doctrine was properly
before the court, the court improperly extended the reach of the doctrine 
in both Halicki and Towle.  By relying on Halicki, the Towle court 
sidestepped the most controversial question in the case: whether a car 
should be considered a character.  Recall that the Halicki court 
emphasized Eleanor’s “hard to steal” characteristic as improving its 
originality, but failed to explain whether originality was measured 
against other cars generally, other cars stolen in the film, other pseudo-
anthropomorphic cars, or some combination thereof.184  Again, all the 
180. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1015.
181. See id. at 1016–17; see also supra text accompanying notes 160-61.  Again, DC
Comics had licensed the right to create a Batmobile as a derivative work to the producers 
responsible for the television show and film on which Mr. Towle modeled his copies.  DC 
Comics argued that it had kept its merchandising rights—and therefore its copyrights—
despite its licenses.  The court agreed; this author disagrees. 
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales and Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 
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cars on the list to be stolen in the film had female codenames, and there 
is no indication that the Eleanor car demonstrated anything in the way of 
anthropomorphism.185  The Eleanor cars seemed more to be the 
protagonist’s instrument of demise—ultimately, storytelling tools.186  
Further fact-finding or reconsideration on remand never occurred.  Such 
an opinion should not be relied upon for “cars are characters” precedent. 
Despite these shortcomings, the Towle court leaned on Halicki and 
little else.  The Ninth Circuit spent no time reflecting on the concept of 
a character-car and the Halicki precedent.187  Instead, it cited Halicki for 
the proposition that a car could be a character and proceeded to apply the 
character test to the Batmobile.188  While each Batmobile is certainly 
covered under the copyright in the medium in which it appears, the 
Batmobile’s eligibility for characterhood is questionable.  In this way, 
Towle commits the same error as Halicki and worsens the state of the 
law by blindly continuing down the car-as-character path. 
Following the plain meaning principles of legal interpretation, a 
character is generally a person, animal, or anthropomorphic figure that 
interacts with others and experiences events.  Neither Halicki nor Towle 
discussed whether it was important that the cars in question were or were 
not made more like humans by their authors.  In evaluating whether a 
car could be a character, the Ninth Circuit did not need to take a bright-
line position for or against cars as characters.  In fact, several cars come 
to mind that clearly seem to play a character role: Herbie the Love Bug189 
or Christine,190 for instance.  While it is true that characters need not 
speak or be human, a character by definition is more than a mere object. 
The rationale is not so much that plot devices do not deserve protection 
as that plot devices are often scenès à faire—the similarities between the 
allegedly infringing work and the original work must be more than mere 
stock imagery, story elements, or characters.  The Halicki and Towle 
decisions both apply the “delineation” test without regard to this 
threshold inquiry.   
C. Flaws in the Test Itself
The third issue with the Towle decision is that the Ninth Circuit’s
2008). 
185.  GONE IN 60 SECONDS, supra note 152.
186.  Id.
187. See generally DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015).
188. Id. at 1019–20.
189. Herbie the Love Bug is a sentient 1963 Volkswagen Beetle that can drive itself and
interacts with human characters.  THE LOVE BUG (Buena Vista Distribution 1968). 
190. Christine is a sentient Plymouth Fury that interacts with—or really, violently
attacks—human characters.  STEPHEN KING, CHRISTINE (1983). 
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test fails to adequately capture when a character should be covered under 
the copyright in an original work.  The Ninth Circuit stated that a 
character is protectable when it: (1) has physical as well as conceptual 
properties; (2) is sufficiently delineated as to be recognizable whenever 
it appears through consistent, identifiable traits; and (3) is especially 
distinctive, containing some elements of original expression.191  The first 
prong seems intended to evoke the traditional Air Pirates bias toward 
protection for visually rendered characters, while the second and third 
prongs both seem to point to the delineation test developed from Nichols 
onward. 
At first glance, these three prongs are the most succinct articulation 
of character copyright yet, but the Ninth Circuit remains silent on 
whether and when the “story being told” language of the “Sam Spade 
test” is relevant.  Lower courts are left to wonder whether the “Sam 
Spade test” ought to be applied only to literary characters, or used at all. 
For example, the first prong of the new Towle test requires physical 
characteristics in addition to conceptual ones.192  This requirement either 
indicates that literary characters are never protectable because they are 
merely conceptual, or that literary characters must be evaluated under a 
different, unmentioned standard.  The former proposition is unsatisfying: 
if characters are to receive copyright protection at all, it seems logical 
that at least some literary characters are entitled to share in that 
protection.  The latter proposition—use of a different standard—seems 
to point to the “Sam Spade test,” a test that courts have only 
intermittently applied.   
Preference for visual characters makes sense insofar as copyright 
arises in tangible works of authorship.  Characters are always a concept, 
unless they are rendered in a way that makes the character a tangible, 
fixed work of authorship.193  A visual character is inherently better 
delineated and described in the copyrighted work, and there is a clear 
expression of the character to use in the infringement comparison.  With 
literary characters and with characters that have evolved over time, the 
courts grant a copyright in what is ultimately a court-described character 
concept, allowing the author to enjoy a broad and, as seen in the 
scattershot of cases, somewhat unpredictable scope of copyright 
protection.  It is true that having physical characteristics makes a 
character better delineated, but it is unclear whether the author of a 
physical character is really getting anything more than the copyright he 
191.  Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
192. Id.
193. Recall that copyright only arises in original works by authors that have been “fixed”
to a tangible medium, like taking pencil to paper.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2017).   
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already owns in his work.  Therefore, the first prong of the Towle test 
and the cases differentiating literary and visual characters seem 
redundant considering copyright’s normal mode of operation.   
The second prong of the Towle test is not problematic.  It requires 
a character to be both sufficiently and consistently delineated, thereby 
incorporating the concerns of prior cases regarding characters that 
change over time or are depicted in various ways.194  However, it is 
important that courts remain careful in applying the “delineation” test 
encapsulated in this second prong; they have historically looked to 
uncopyrightable character features—a method that seems to consider a 
protectable character to be one that is something more than the sum of 
its (uncopyrightable) parts.195  The “delineation” test tallies up those 
story elements that, when combined, give rise to a sufficiently original 
character.196  Courts must engage in fine line drawing to tease out that 
which defines and delineates the character, and that which constitutes 
plot devices, scènes à faire, and undeveloped characters—the tools of 
storytelling.197 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s third prong blurs the distinctions 
between traditional copyright tests and trademark tests.  The language of 
distinctiveness is historically the province of trademark law.198  The 
Towle court is not the first court to use “distinctive” nearly 
interchangeably with “delineated” or “original” in character copyright 
decisions.199  However, the inclusion of a distinctiveness requirement as 
its own prong raises questions, such as whether courts intend to import 
trademark law definitions for interpreting sufficient distinctiveness. 
Such an importation could improve the predictability of the 
character doctrine by increasing the available body of law illustrating 
sufficient distinctiveness and providing a sliding scale for evaluation.200  
194. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
195. See discussion supra Part II.C.
196.  Said, supra note 178, at 800–01 (discussing the need to ensure that those attributes
which together constitute a visual or literary character do not bleed over into attributes of the 
surrounding story). 
197.  Id.
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)-(f) (2017); see also TMEP § 1209.1 (Jan. 2017).  The spectrum 
of distinctiveness—from generic terms (like the name of good being sold) to fanciful or 
arbitrary terms (like “Exxon” for gasoline or “Apple” for computers, respectively)—is used 
to determine whether a mark may be registered for certain goods and services as well as how 
strong the mark will be for consumers.  Arbitrary and fanciful marks are stronger and will be 
afforded greater protection against confusingly similar marks.  Suggestive and descriptive 
marks are weaker and are afforded a narrower scope of protection, and generic marks are 
afforded none.  Thus, the question of being distinctive is a trademark concern not used 
elsewhere in copyright. 
199. See discussion supra Part II.C.
200. TMEP § 1209.1 (Jan. 2017).
510 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
After all, trademarks are most distinctive when they are unusual and 
fanciful201—is a character not most original when it is unusual and 
fanciful?  At the other end of the spectrum, generic marks cannot obtain 
protection at all—just as a trope character is not protectable.  The 
majority of cases, of course, lies somewhere between, but the number of 
reference points for analogy and distinction in arguing cases could be 
greatly increased by making trademark “distinctiveness” law available. 
Also, trademark allows distinctiveness to be shown by evidence of 
secondary meaning, acquired through usage in the marketplace that 
builds meaning in the eyes of consumers, where the mark is otherwise 
not distinctive.202 
Bringing this idea into copyright law could prevent situations where 
characters are forced into an ill-fitting category because of the court’s 
gut feeling that the character should be protectable.  Instead, authors 
could demonstrate that the character is sufficiently recognizable that 
even when taken out of context, the consumer knows the character is the 
author’s work—therefore, the person appropriating the character is using 
the goodwill and recognition constructed by another author to attract 
consumers to his own work.  Contrary to the rejected “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine, in which a person’s copying was prohibited because it 
constituted free-riding on another’s effort, the character-as-trademark 
rationale seeks to prevent the wrongful appropriation of a character that 
has become the symbol of a certain author and his business in the eyes 
of the consuming public.  This policy protects the investment of the 
original author, but does not blindly reward effort by excluding others; 
the original author would have to demonstrate not only the similarity of 
the allegedly infringing character, but that the public would attribute the 
infringer’s work to the original author because of the character’s use. 
However, the foregoing trademark policy does not reflect how 
courts are currently evaluating the protection of characters, although the 
decisions seem to be employing it without saying so.  Courts should not 
mix doctrines lightly—such a combination should be made explicit, 
rather than sprinkled without mention or clarification throughout 
existing precedents.  If the Ninth Circuit intended to link doctrines in the 
third prong of the Towle test, they neither discussed it nor applied the 
test in a way suggestive of the ensuing link.203 
201. Id.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2017).
203. See generally DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015).
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D. “Hard Cases Make Bad Law”204
The fourth and final problem with Towle is that the court’s analysis
distorted the scope of character protection, even though the result 
correctly stopped a bad actor from copying another author’s work.  The 
court’s holding was overbroad: much of what the court cited as 
protectable attributes constituting a Batmobile character would be scènes 
à faire, and therefore outside the scope of protection, in other cases. 
Further, the court impermissibly amalgamated these unoriginal features 
of many Batmobiles, creating a construct or persona to receive protection 
and ignoring the requirement for consistent traits suggested in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer and Toho.205  While this practice got the court to the 
desired result, it sets a poor precedent for future cases. 
The Ninth Circuit cited a few lines that vaguely characterized the 
Batmobile as anthropomorphic, describing it as “leaping” after a 
criminal and “throbbing” with energy; on at least one occasion, the car 
drove itself to Batman’s side.206  However, there is no evidence that the 
Batmobile really interacts with Batman in a way suggestive of a 
character role.  Autonomous interactivity with other characters and the 
world at large would be the greatest indication that an otherwise 
inanimate object is anthropomorphic and acting as a character, instead 
of a prop.  In contrast, in the films featuring Herbie and Christine, other 
characters understood the car involved to be more than just a car.207  The 
Batmobile may be specialized for fighting crime, but it lacks any degree 
of interactivity that characters normally engage in.  Therefore, the 
character copyright analysis is an awkward fit from the outset.  
The Towle court failed to recognize that generally, superhero 
vehicles with outlandish capabilities belong in the scènes à faire 
category, just like “mechanized body armor.”208   Vehicles with 
outlandish capabilities are a critical piece of the hero puzzle. 
Superheroes must be able to quickly reach trouble spots with the proper 
equipment to fight the evil du jour.  If the court had articulated better 
why the Batmobile was particularly original as compared to other 
vehicles and thereby limited its holding, it would have avoided the 
problem of overbreadth.  Instead, it named only either run-of-the-mill 
204. While this legal adage is of uncertain origin, one of the earliest known uses in the
United States was by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Northern Securities Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting).   
205. See discussion supra Part II.C.
206. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2015).
207. See THE LOVE BUG, supra note 189; see also CHRISTINE, supra note 190.
208. Horizon Comics Prods. v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44662, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017). 
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attributes to support the Batmobile’s copyright protection, or attributes 
that were not consistent across all Batmobiles.209  Of course, it appears 
that without these consistent-but-generic or original-but-inconsistent 
attributes, the court could not otherwise support the finding that the 
Batmobiles of the television and film expressions were the same 
Batmobile as in the comics’ copyrights, owned by DC Comics.   
The Ninth Circuit counted as delineating characteristics the 
Batmobile’s different gadgets over the years: machine gun, Bat-phone, 
mobile crime lab, emergency Bat-turn maneuverability.210  These 
characteristics may or may not be distinctive as compared to other 
vehicles, but the different iterations of the Batmobile each feature only 
those characteristics needed to get the job done on any given day.  The 
court had to aggregate years of data and dozens of works to create a 
protectable “persona”—for lack of a better term—that constitutes the 
Batmobile.  In fact, some of these elements ascribed to that persona were 
uncopyrightable or not original to the Batmobile.  Uncopyrightable 
elements included the Batmobile name and the list of crime-fighting 
gadgets—the former being the province of trademark and the latter being 
mostly scènes à faire.   
Several of the characteristics the court deemed original and bat-like, 
like the exaggerated fenders and distinctive rounded windshield of the 
1966 Batmobile, were features of the Lincoln Futura concept car on 
which that particular Batmobile rendition was based.211  Indeed, the 
Batmobile is rarely seen the same way twice212 or even referred to by the 
same name in all circumstances; most recently, it was called the Tumbler 
and depicted as a tank.213  The Batmobile is not an evolution of a single 
character; put another way, to copy one Batmobile is not to copy them 
all.  Rather, the Batmobile is a different vehicle, customized to suit a 
storyline, often—but not always—with the same name and with wide 
variation in aesthetics.  Therefore, Mr. Towle’s copying of the 1968 and 
1989 Batmobiles did not infringe DC Comics’ copyrights in other 
209. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1017–18 (listing the attributes as “one consistent name that
identifies [the Batmobile] as Batman’s personal vehicle,” consistent use of “high-tech gadgets 
and weaponry,” “bat-like motif,” black color, the qualities of being “swift, cunning, strong 
and elusive,” and depiction as a “superhero” in its own right—“Batman’s sidekick if not an 
extension of Batman’s own persona”); cf. Jason Torchinsky, “All the Most Important 
Batmobiles in One Handy Chart,” JALOPNIK, http://jalopnik.com/this-batmobile-timeline-
shows-just-how-diverse-batmans-1575695589 (depicting numerous Batmobile versions over 
the years, including a red Batmobile, motorcycle, tank, or commercially available car 
Batmobiles, etc.). 
210.  Towle, 802 F.3d at 1022.
211. “Building the Batmobile Part 1,” supra note 171.
212. Torchinsky, supra note 209.
213.  BATMAN BEGINS (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005).
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Batmobile expressions because there simply is no unitary Batmobile, 
despite some commonalities among some of the designs.   
These changes are much more drastic than James Bond shedding 
his swimsuit for a tuxedo.  The Ninth Circuit combined characteristics, 
many of which are not originally attributable to the Batmobile or which 
are not consistent across all Batmobiles, to stretch character copyright to 
cover a superhero car belonging in the scènes à faire category.  The court 
contented itself with generalities—crime-fighting, maneuverability, and 
black color—when in fact, the first Batmobile was red, and one 
Batmobile was even a tuned-up Ford Mustang.214  While the extent of 
the creative expression in any given Batmobile is copyrightable, the 
Batmobile as a construct across many comics and films is simply not 
protectable through a character analysis because the Batmobile is not a 
character, and it lacks sufficient original and consistent traits even if it 
were. 
V. PROPOSAL
Holy copyright, Batman!  What do we do now?215 
To repair the four problems with the current state of character 
copyright—permitting a forced character analysis, the persistence of 
faulty precedent in Halicki that was worsened by Towle, the flawed 
Towle test, and its overbroad holding—courts and Congress should take 
three responsive actions.  First, poor precedent should be overruled at 
the next opportunity. Second, Congress should fashion a more limited 
character copyright test.  Third, Congress should also deploy trademark 
law to avoid forced analyses in situations like Towle, where there has 
been misappropriation of something that the consuming public 
recognizes as pertaining to a certain business or individual.  Trademark 
law can be used to protect characters or non-character story elements that 
are distinctive relative to the media in which they appear and 
merchandise for which they are marketed. 
A. The Judicial Fix
Likely the sole action that courts could undertake to repair character
copyright without Congressional assistance is to overrule Halicki and 
Towle, to the extent that they blindly permit cars to be characters.  As 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Towle,216 another character-
214.  Torchinsky, supra note 209.
215.  In this author’s defense, such an exclamation is by no means the strangest or corniest 
catchphrase made in the style of Robin, of the 1960s Batman television show.   
216.  Towle v. DC Comics, 136 S. Ct. 1390 (2016) (denying certiorari).
514 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
copyright case dealing with cars would have to percolate through the 
court system.  Should the case come up in another circuit, that court 
could choose not to follow the Ninth Circuit and thereby signal the need 
for Supreme Court intervention.  These actions would prevent increased 
stretching of character copyright based on faulty precedents.  However, 
the likelihood of a fact pattern that permits a court to squarely address 
this issue is rather slim. 
B. Reserving Character Copyright to Characters
Congress could bring about a more complete fix with a new
character copyright test.  Characters are valuable commodities, and 
whole industries are built around their creation, adaptation, and 
protection.  The proper venue for mapping the future of the doctrine is 
the legislature.  Congress should note the lack of administrability of the 
current test and the lack of Copyright Office guidance.  Ideally, Congress 
should host a forum in which the public and the entertainment industry 
can present policy arguments for how the law ought to be.  Such a 
growing area of copyright law as character copyright doctrine would be 
better governed by statute.  However, characters should not be added to 
the list of registrable copyrights; since the Copyright Office generally 
does not employ a rigorous prosecution process, it would be easy for 
authors to claim insufficiently original characters that would then need 
to be invalidated via costly and time-consuming litigation. 
Congress should employ a statutory test for the copyrightability of 
characters.  While the delineation test has a rich history stemming from 
a respected judge, its administration is hazy at best and arbitrary at worst. 
The threshold requirement of characterhood should be an express first 
step in the character copyright inquiry.  A character ought to be defined 
as an interactive—albeit not necessarily human—role in a story, where 
interactivity is evidenced by some degree of anthropomorphism, 
sentience (or at least perception), autonomous action, and influence on 
the events happening around it.  A balancing test for characterhood 
would be flexible enough that a strong factor could cure a weaker one, 
but anthropomorphism and sentience should likely be given the most 
weight.  In addition, anthropomorphism may be evidenced by the actions 
of other characters in the story and how they treat the story element in 
question. 
For example, “Eleanor” could not act autonomously and was not 
sentient, though the cars with that code name seemed to influence events. 
Under this test, Eleanor would not be a character.  Similarly, the 
Batmobile had some influence on events around it and a very limited 
degree of autonomous action, yet it did not perceive and understand 
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events.  Conversely, both Herbie and Christine were capable of fully 
autonomous action, demonstrated an understanding of events, reacted to 
influence those events, and were highly personified.  Not only did they 
display human emotion in some ways (comedic effect and rage, 
respectively), but the characters more or less responded to these 
particular cars as they would respond to a human or animal with the same 
characteristics. 
In addition to the characterhood requirement, Congress should 
eliminate the lingering “Sam Spade test”—the language of the 
“chessman” versus the “story being told” seems generally unhelpful. 
Usage of this test in the case law is spotty, sometimes combined with the 
delineation test and sometimes absent entirely; it should be abrogated by 
statute to encourage consistency. 
C. Giving In to the Silent Trend: Use Trademark Law Explicitly
Finally, Congress should bless the use of trademark law in
character—and even non-character story element—protection.  As 
discussed, courts have been vaguely employing trademark law while 
evaluating characters, turning repeatedly to their distinctiveness or their 
name recognition as indicators of copyrightability.  Part of the Towle 
decision surely was the desire to punish a bad actor, who without 
authorization misappropriated the exact likeness of another’s work for 
his own commercial gain—going so far as to advertise his copies under 
the famous Batmobile name.  However, the analysis that reached the 
desired result required a tortured reading of the law and a willfully blind 
consideration of facts concerning the Batmobile’s diverse designs.  The 
law should employ trademark law in an overt and intentional way, rather 
than as a subtext in court decisions. 
Besides starting anew with a fresh character copyright test, 
trademark law could be used to protect those characters or distinctive 
non-character elements—such as the Batmobile—where they are 
source-identifying in connection with the goods and services marketed: 
the comics, movies, television shows, toys, and other merchandise.  The 
true goal of DC Comics in suing Mr. Towle was to protect its ability to 
profit from the Batmobile, its creation, and avoid public confusion that 
DC Comics had authorized or endorsed Mr. Towle to create authentic 
replicas.  Had a trademark been registered or asserted under common 
law in the name “Batmobile” or in the design of the 1966 or 1989 
Batmobiles, DC Comics could easily have asserted its rights against Mr. 
Towle.  As the Batmobile—and many, many other characters or famous 
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non-character story elements217—is often used as a marketing tool in 
connection with Batman-related merchandise, model cars (large or 
small), and new Batman adventures, it seems a natural subject of 
trademark law. 
In addition, trademark protection would likely back the decisions 
regarding the copyrightability of Rocky, James Bond, and Godzilla, to 
name a few: all are largely recognizable characters, which helps avoid 
overturning more case law than necessary.  Courts would benefit from 
some objective indicia to consider regarding secondary meaning, 
thereby reducing the arbitrariness of character decisions. 
Of course, authors of popular and famous works would be better 
positioned to exploit their characters and protect them from 
infringement.  What is really happening is ad hoc brand management 
accomplished by claiming copyright protections for uncopyrightable 
elements—useful articles, non-characters, or stock characters—that are 
nonetheless quite famous and therefore seem like they should be off-
limits for the commercial gain of those who did not author them.  The 
lawsuits are pursued because these creations have become so 
commercially important today, with enormous industries centered on the 
development and marketing of derivative works.  There is, of course, 
nothing wrong with this commercialization, but as conventional wisdom 
counsels: call a spade, a spade.  It is better to stop stretching copyright 
law by labeling uncopyrightable story elements “characters” in order to 
protect them when used outside the context of the original work in which 
they arose.  In fact, trademark law is more flexible, as it is limited only 
to that which is capable of source identification—for example, there is 
no pesky “useful articles” or “idea/expression dichotomy” doctrines to 
avoid.  As discussed in this Comment, nearly all character copyright 
cases are brought to prevent others from benefitting commercially from 
using story elements, whether characters or otherwise, to market 
additional goods or services that the public may improperly believe 
emanated from the original author.  Trademark law offers the appropriate 
remedies for such misappropriation and likelihood of confusion. Story 
elements that are being used as trademarks should be protected as 
trademarks. 
One criticism of using trademark law might be that trademarks do 
not expire unless no longer used in commerce.  Therefore, a character 
used and protected as a trademark would not pass into the public domain 
for so long as it is used.  Functionally speaking, it is unclear that there 
217. See, e.g., brand management usage of characters like Mickey Mouse, the Disney
princesses, Superman, and Spiderman, or non-characters like Star Wars’ AT-ATs or Thor’s 
hammer, Mjolnir. 
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would be much of a change in the manner of doing business; DC Comics 
could register a trademark in “Batmobile” or a silhouette of the 
Batmobile or other design mark in connection with films, toys, etc. at 
any time.  A change in the law such as the one proposed might actually 
encourage companies to be judicious about which story elements are 
commercially important enough to protect, permitting others to lapse 
into the public domain. 
CONCLUSION 
The best cure for the currently unbounded character copyright 
doctrine is to check the courts with clear legislation.  The Copyright Act 
should be amended, following a forum at which differing public interests 
would be represented.  A new character copyright test should require a 
showing of characterhood to prevent decisions like the one in Towle.  In 
addition, Congress should recognize that characters and other story 
elements are being used as trademarks.  Therefore, characters and non-
characters should be protected as trademarks when they are being used 
as such in connection with diverse media and merchandise—particularly 
since courts have played with trademark terminology during character 
copyright evaluations for years.  Such a change would improve 
predictability and objectivity in results, while being familiar enough for 
courts to administer without exceptional difficulty.   
Quick, to the (uncopyrightable) Batmobile! 
